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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - REGULA-
TION PROHIBITING SLEEPING IN NATIONAL PARKS UP-
HELD AS A VALID TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER 
REGULATION REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SLEEPING IS 
. SPEECH. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 
3065 (1984). 
A community activist group applied to the National Park Service 
for a permit to conduct a demonstration in Lafayette Park near the 
White House and on the Mall to illuminate the plight of the homeless. I 
The group planned to erect two symbolic campsites where it would stage 
a continuing twenty-four hour vigil. The demonstration would include 
sleeping.2 The Park Service granted both the twenty-four hour permit 
and permission to erect the temporary structures, but denied the activist 
group permission to actually sleep in the structures because, according to 
Park Service regulations, sleeping in the structures constitutes "camp-
ing," an activity expressly prohibited in Lafayette Park and on the MalP 
The activist group brought suit in the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia seeking a preliminary injunction against the 
Park Service's application of the no-camping regulations to the demon-
stration.4 The district court denied the injunction and granted the gov-
ernment's motion for summary judgment.s On appeal the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and en-
joined application of the no-camping regulation, finding that although 
the activist group's proposed sleeping activities fell within the purview of 
the regulations,6 the proposed act of sleeping was so highly communica-
I. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3068 (1984). 
2.Id. 
3. Id. The activist group had previously sought permission to sleep in connection with 
a similar demonstration and was denied such permission by the Park Service pursu-
ant to regulation 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1981), which prohibited "camping primarily 
for living accommodation." The group successfully challenged the denial by con-
tending that its sleep within the context of the demonstration was not primarily for 
living accommodation. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 670 
F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam), affd on rehearing, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (per curiam) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-
Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). In direct response, the Park Service amended its 
regulation specifically to include the type of activity in which the activist group 
sought to engage. The amended regulation prohibiting camping defined that activ-
ity as "the use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping 
activities" and provided further that such activities constitute camping "when it 
reasonably appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the participants, in con-
ducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation regard-
less of the intent of the participants or the nature of any other activities in which they 
may also be engaging." (Emphasis added). 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1982) (The cur-
rent version is identical. See 36 C.F.R. § 50.27(a) (1984)). 
4. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, D.C. Civil Action No. 82-02501 
(D.D.C.), rev'd, 670 F.2d 1213 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam), affd 01/ rehearing, 
703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). 
5.Id. 
6. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586,591 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
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tive within the context of the demonstration that it qualified as speech 
entitled to first amendment protection. The court found that the activist 
group's first amendment right outweighed the government's interest in 
the no-camping regulation as applied to the group's activity.7 The 
Supreme Court upheld the regulation, reversing the circuit court.8 The 
Court assumed, but did not decide, that the sleeping activity in this case 
constituted protected speech.9 It then held that the no-camping regula-
tion was a valid time, place, and manner regulation of speech in a public 
forum. \0 
Because the exercise of first amendment ll rights in public places, 
such as sidewalks, streets, and parks, is both an effective and inexpensive 
method of conveying messages to large groups, public forums historically 
have been held open to the use of the public for purposes of assembly and 
communication. 12 The extent to which the government may restrict 
speech in public forums is therefore limited. 13 
Courts long have held that speech is not confined to verbal or writ-
ten expression, but that appropriate types of conduct may also qualify as 
speech protected by the first amendment. 14 Such communicative con-
duct serves an important first amendment function in that it enables a 
larger and more diverse group of people to communicate, it promotes the 
communication of a wider range of ideas, and it exposes more people to 
the message. IS Diverse activities such as the "silent and reproachful 
presence" of blacks participating in a sit-in in a segregated public li-
brary,16 refusal to salute the flag,17 wearing a jacket with "Fuck the 
Draft" printed on it,18 and wearing black arm bands in school to protest 
(per curiam) (en banc), rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). 
7. Id. at 599 (six to five decision). 
8. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3067 (1984). 
9. Id. at 3069. 
10. Id. at 3069-71. 
11. The first amendment to the Constitution provides, in relevant part: "Congress shall 
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press .... " U.S. 
CON ST. amend. I. 
12. Hague v. Community for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Kalven, 
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11-12. 
13. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (to be valid, the regulation must 
satisfy the requirements of time, place, and manner restrictions); see infra notes 25-
27 and accompanying text. 
14. Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 467, 
469 (1984); see also Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term - Forward: On Draw-
ing Lines, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (1968) (discussion of Supreme Court hold-
ings on expressive conduct). 
15. Note, supra note 14, at 470-71; see also Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1091, 1107 (1968) (denying first amendment protection for symbolic speech 
unnecessarily alienates those who do not possess verbal skills). 
16. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966). 
17. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
18. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
1985 Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence 183 
war 19 have been found to be speech protected by the first amendment. 
Despite a basic recognition that communicative conduct may be 
considered protected speech, however, the Court does not accept the 
view that any conduct intended by the actor to express an idea can be 
labeled speech entitled to protection under the first amendment. 20 
Spence v. Washington 21 represents the Supreme Court's most substantial 
effort to articulate principles for distinguishing between expressive con-
duct that deserves first amendment protection and noncommunicative 
conduct that is not worthy of such protection. 22 In Spence, the defend-
ant attached a peace symbol to the American flag and hung it out of his 
apartment window to express his feeling that America stands for peace. 
He was convicted of violating a state statute prohibiting misuse of the 
American flag. The Court found that the government's interest in 
prohibiting the alleged misuse was not great enough to outweigh 
Spence's first amendment right to free speech, if in fact he was entitled to 
first amendment protection under the circumstances.23 In deciding 
whether to overturn his conviction, the Court was thus required to deter-
mine whether Spence's activity qualified as symbolic speech. According 
to the test formulated in Spence, conduct qualifies as speech if the intent 
of the speaker is to convey a particular message and there is a great likeli-
hood that the message will be understood by those who view it. 24 
Even when conduct does qualify as speech, it may nevertheless be 
subject to some restriction by government regulation. The government 
may validly regulate the time, place, or manner of speech in a public 
forum to assure public safety, convenience, and welfare. 25 When such a 
regulation inhibits communicative expression, it is nevertheless valid so 
long as the regulation is content neutral,26 is narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant government interest, and leaves available ample alternative 
19. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
20. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (defendant who publicly burned 
his draft card in protest of the draft and the Vietnam War unsuccessfully contended 
that his action was symbolic speech protected by the first amendment). 
21. 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam). 
22. See generally Note, supra note 14, at 476-78. 
23. Spence, 418 U.S. at 415. 
24. Id. at 409-11. 
25. One of the earliest cases to articulate this principle was Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 
U.S. 569 (1941), a case involving the validity of a statute prohibiting parades or 
processions on public streets without a permit. Id. at 576; see also Heffron v. Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981) (Supreme 
Court upheld a regulation prohibiting the sale or distribution on a fairgrounds of 
any merchandise or printed material unless sold or distributed from fixed locations 
(booths) where the purpose of the regulation was to maintain the orderly movement 
of the crowd at the fair). 
26. "Content neutral" means that the regulation restricts communication regardless of 
the message, as opposed to a content based regulation, which restricts communica-
tion precisely because of the message to be conveyed. See generally Stone, Content 
Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 189-90 (1983). 
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channels of communication.27 
The government may also regulate conduct, even if the regulation 
infringes incidentally on symbolic expression that qualifies as speech. 
This type of regulation was challenged in United States v. O'Brien,28 in 
which the Court upheld a conviction for violating an ordinance prohibit-
ing the knowing destruction of draft cards, when the defendant had pub-
licly burned his draft card to protest both the draft and the Vietnam 
War. The Court found that the government's interest in prohibiting the 
destruction of draft cards outweighed the defendant's interest in burning 
his card to protest the war, regardless of whether the act of burning the 
card qualified as speech. The O'Brien Court noted that when speech and 
non speech elements are combined in a course of conduct, the govern-
mental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 
infringement upon speech if the interest is substantia1.29 The Court indi-
cated that the regulation may be justified if it meets the following criteria: 
1) it is within the constitutional power of the government; 2) it furthers a 
substantial governmental interest; 3) this interest is unrelated to suppres-
sion of free expression; and 4) the incidental restriction on first amend-
ment rights is no greater than necessary to further the government 
interest. 30 
Both the time, place, and manner regulations and the O'Brien crite-
ria for justifying government regulation of communicative conduct rely 
in part upon the substantiality of the government's interest to be fur-
thered by the regulation in question. The Supreme Court clarified the 
method for weighing that interest in Heffron v. International Society for 
Krishna Consciousness. 31 The Court specified that the justification for a 
regulation must be measured by the overall harm the regulation seeks to 
prevent rather than by the harm that would result by exempting one par-
ticular group from the regulation. 32 
The Supreme Court applied these principles in Clark v. Community 
for Creative Non- Violence 33 to determine whether the no-camping regula-
tion violated the activist group's first amendment rights. First, the Court 
found that the promulgation of a regulation prohibiting camping in La-
fayette Park and on the Mall was constitutionally within the authority of 
the Park Service.34 Additionally, it found the no-camping regulation to 
be content neutral, because it applied equally to all persons who may 
27. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 
(1981). 
28. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
29. !d. at 377. 
30. !d. at 376-77. 
31. 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
32. [d. at 652-54. 
33. 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984). 
34. [d. at 3071-72. The Court noted that the activist group did not contest the constitu-
tionality of the regulation except as to its effect on the group's proposed demonstra-
tion. !d. 
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desire to camp in the restricted areas, and because its implementation 
was not based on a Park Service disagreement with any messages that 
might otherwise be presented by persons seeking to use the park areas for 
public forum speech.35 Finally, the Court pointed out that the prohibi-
tion on camping in Lafayette Park and on the Mall did not preclude the 
activist group from communicating its message to the public, as it had 
ample alternative channels of communication open to it by virtue of its 
twenty-four hour permit and permission to erect symbolic structures in 
connection with its demonstration.36 
The parties disputed only whether the government's interest to be 
served by the regulation was substantial and whether the regulation was 
sufficiently narrow to be no more restrictive than necessary to fulfill the 
government's interestY The Court upheld the regulation as to both 
challenges. 38 It found the government's interest in alleviating wear and 
tear on the parks and in maintaining those areas in an attractive condi-
tion, available for the enjoyment and use of the public, to be substan-
tial. 39 The Court further found that allowing camping in those areas 
would be totally inimical to the advancement of those interests.40 Be-
cause the no-camping regulation prohibits camping by both demonstra-
tors and non-demonstrators alike, the Court found the regulation to be as 
least restrictive as possible because damage to the parks, as well as their 
partial inaccessibility to the public, would result from camping, whether 
engaged in for speech purposes or purely as a living accommodation.41 
Finally, the Court rejected the finding of the court of appeals that 
because there were less speech-restrictive alternatives available to the 
Park Service, the no-camping regulation was invalid.42 The Court stated 
that these alternatives, such as reducing the size, duration, or frequency 
of demonstrations in the area, would still curtail the total allowable com-
munication by demonstrators. 43 It added that such alternatives merely 
represented a disagreement with the Park Service over how much protec-
tion should be afforded the parks and how that protection should be ef-
fectuated. The Court pointed out that such determination legitimately 
belongs to the Park Service, not the judiciary.44 
35. Id. at 3070. 
36. Id. A regulation will not be invalidated even if the alternative channel is not the 
most effective means of communication, because although the first amendment 
guarantees the right to deliver a message, it does not guarantee any right to deliver 
that message in the most effective manner possible. See, e.g., Heffron v. Interna-
tional Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Lloyd Corp. v. Tan-
ner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
37. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3070-72 (1984). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 3070. 
40. [d. 
41. Id. at 3071. 
42. Id. at 3072. 
43.Id. 
44.Id. 
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The Court acknowledged the anomalous situation that resulted 
when the no-camping regulation was applied to demonstrators with 
twenty-four hour permits and permission to erect temporary structures, 
because the act of sleeping by such demonstrators would not appear in 
and of itself to add any additional wear and tear on the parks.45 Based 
on the overall harm to be prevented by the camping prohibition, which is 
the correct measure of the government's interest in a regulation,46 the 
Court rejected the contention that the existence of such an anomaly in-
validated the no-camping regulation.47 It added that even were the gov-
ernment's interest to be assessed by applying the camping prohibition 
directly to demonstrators holding twenty-four hour permits with permis-
sion to erect structures, the government's interest in prohibiting sleeping 
was still substantial; the prohibition on sleeping would limit the nature, 
extent, and duration of around-the-clock demonstrations and would pre-
vent some of those demonstrations from materializing at all, thus effec-
tively easing the pressure on the parks.48 
Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented vehemently from the ma-
jority opinion. They found that the activist group's proposed sleep, 
within the context of its demonstration, clearly satisfied the Spence test, 
thus qualifying as speech.49 Weighing the activist group's free speech 
rights against the countervailing interests of the government in imposing 
its no-camping regulation to protect the parks, the dissent found the gov-
ernment's interest too insubstantial to sustain the regulation as applied to 
the group. so The dissent's reasoning concerning the substantiality of the 
government's interest agreed with that of six of the eleven judges of the 
lower court: because the Park Service allowed the activist group to erect 
temporary structures and to engage in a twenty-four hour vigil (symbolic 
camping), it was illogical to suggest that although the government did 
not prohibit feigned sleeping, it had a substantial interest in prohibiting 
real sleeping - so substantial, in fact, as to outweigh the activist group's 
first amendment rights.5 I 
The key to the issue in Clark was the correct standard for determin-
45. Id. at 3070-7 \. Park Service regulations originally prohibited both 24-hour demon-
strations as well as the erection of temporary structures. In response to lower court 
opinions invalidating those regulations, see, e.g., United States v. Abney, 534 F.2d 
984 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (per curiam); A Quaker Action Group v. Morton, 516 F.2d 
717 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 
1972) (per curiam), the Park Service chose to change its regulations rather than to 
appeal the decisions to the Supreme Court. Ironically, it is that decision to allow 
the 24-hour vigils and erection of temporary structures that has created the anomaly 
caused by the sleeping prohibition. 
46. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 652-54 
(1981); see supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
47. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065,3070-71 (1984). 
48. Id. at 3071. 
49. Id. at 3073 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
50. Id. at 3078 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
5 \. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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ing whether the regulation furthers a government interest that is substan-
tial, which, under Heffron, is measured by the overall harm the 
regulation seeks to prevent. 52 The Court found that the government's 
interest in alleviating wear and tear on its national parks, so that they 
will be attractive and available for public use and enjoyment, is substan-
tial. The Court did not, however, provide any new guidance for use of 
the Spence test in determining whether conduct qualifies as speech pro-
tected by the first amendment. The Court merely assumed for the sake 
of its decision that the camping/sleeping activity in this case was pro-
tected communicative conduct. 
The significance of Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence 
thus lies in the Court's characterization of the government's interest in 
reducing wear and tear on its national parks as substantial. Because of 
this substantial interest, not only can the Park Service validly prohibit 
actual camping in national parks, but it follows that the currently permit-
ted symbolic camping can be prohibited as well. Indeed, the Court's 
dicta suggests this conclusion. In response to lower court decisions, the 
Park Service had changed its regulations to allow twenty-four hour vigils 
and the erection of temporary structures in connection with demonstra-
tions.53 The majority twice implied that should the Park Service choose 
to reinstate its original prohibition on both practices, the Supreme Court 
would uphold the regulation. 54 Instead of affording demonstrators fuller 
first amendment protection in public forums, as the activist group had 
hoped, the ultimate result of this case may be the imposition of stricter 
time, place, and manner regulation of communicative speech in Lafayette 
Park and on the Mall, as well as in other national parks. 
Susan H. Hickes 
52. Heffron, 452 U.S. 640, 652-54 (1981); see supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
53. See supra note 45. 
54. "In the first place, we seriously doubt that the First Amendment requires the Park 
Service to permit a demonstration in Lafayette Park and the Mall involving a 24-
hour vigil and the erection of tents to accommodate 150 people." Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 104 S. Ct. 3065, 3070 (1984). "Perhaps these pur-
poses would be more effectively and not so clumsily achieved by preventing tents 
and 24-hour vigils entirely in the core areas." [d. at 3071. 
